This paper examines the perceived ethical values of Malaysian managers. It is based on the opinions of 15 hypothetical ethical/unethical business situations from the 81 managers who agreed to participate in the survey. The findings of this study showed that these Malaysian managers have high ethical values. However 53% of the respondents believed that the ethical standards of today are lower than that of 15 years ago. Apparently, this is related to the existence of many unethical business practices prevalent in (...) the modern business world. The behavior of one's immediate superior is the most important factor in influencing managers to commit unethical practices. The results also indicate only a slight variation among the managers in terms of perceived ethical values by virtue of job position, job specialization, type of business activity or the size of the business organization. (shrink)

In this article I examine the metaphysical foundations of Guido de Ruggiero’s liberalism and ask what these can tell us about his changing view of Giovanni Gentile's actualism, which was such an influence on de Ruggiero before the First World War. I argue that de Ruggiero’s ‘actualism’ was never the same as Gentile’s, but was drawn from the same intellectual sources; that the actualist conception of free and self-conscious agency runs through both versions of the doctrine, though interpreted in different (...) ways; and finally that the contrasts between de Ruggiero’s and Gentile’s political allegiances result from something other than their differing interpretations of actualism, which serves, in the end, not so much as a theory as a set of basic principles, images and ideals that each philosopher tried to modify and match to the political circumstances in which he found himself. (shrink)

Habeşistan Prensi Rasselas Bir Hikâye, Dr. Samuel Johnson’ın (1709-1784) eserlerinin en popüler olanlarından biridir. Eserin ilk okuyucuları onu felsefî ve pratik açıdan önemli bir eser olarak görmüş ve bir roman olarak sınıflandırmanın zor olduğunu düşünmüştür. Johnson, eserini yaklaşık 250 yıl önce yazmasına rağmen bugün de okuyucuya hayatın, ölümün, evliliğin, öğrenmenin, eyleme karşı eylemsizliğin anlamını ve diğer birçok konuyu keşfettirmeye çalışmaktadır. Johnson, ahlak teorilerinden hareketle mutluluğu ele almamaktadır. Ahlakî failin kendisinden, insandan ve insanın yaşadığı hayat ve bunun koşullarından hareketle konuyu anlatmaktadır. (...) Mutluluk anlamında temele alınacak olan fail ve onun içinde bulunduğu şartları değerlendirmektedir. Mutluluk, elde edilenden veya elde etmekten çok arama ve başarmada bulunabilir. Habeşistan Prensi, Voltaire’in (1694-1778) iyimserlik sistemini çürütmek için yazdığı Candide adlı esere, planı ve yapısı bakımından benzerlik göstermektedir. Fakat vardıkları sonuç birbirlerinden oldukça farklıdır. İnsanların mutluluğu bulmayı düşündükleri hemen her unsur ele alınıp bunların istenileni veremeyeceğinin belirtildiği Habeşistan Prensi, yöneticilerden hizmetçilere, yaşlılardan gençlere, bilgelerden cahillere varıncaya kadar her kesimden insanı örneklemektedir. Bütün olaylar mutluluk umuduyla başlamış fakat hayal kırıklığıyla sona ermiştir. Sonuçta romanda kurgusal bir yolculuk aracılığıyla ahlakî bir gerçeklik ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Johnson, Türkiye'de çok fazla tanınmadığı için makalenin giriş kısmında hayatı ve eserlerinin Habeşistan Prensi ile ilgili olan yönlerine kısaca değindik. Çalışmada yöntem olarak nitel araştırmanın imkanlarından yararlanılmış, literatür ve doküman analizi metotları kullanılarak Habeşistan Prensi’nde mutluluk, kötümserlik, iyimserlik konuları incelenmiştir. (shrink)

Current UK legislation is impacting upon the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of medical record-based research aimed at benefiting the NHS and the public heath. Whereas previous commentators have focused on the Data Protection Act 1998, the Health and Social Care Act 2001 is the key legislation for public health researchers wishing to access medical records without written consent. The Act requires researchers to apply to the Patient Information Advisory Group for permission to access medical records without written permission. We present a (...) case study of the work required to obtain the necessary permissions from PIAG in order to conduct a large scale public health research project. In our experience it took eight months to receive permission to access basic identifying information on individuals registered at general practices, and a decision on whether we could access clinical information in medical records without consent took 18 months. Such delays pose near insurmountable difficulties to grant funded research, and in our case £560 000 of public and charitable money was spent on research staff while a large part of their work was prohibited until the third year of a three year grant. We conclude by arguing that many of the current problems could be avoided by returning PIAG’s responsibilities to research ethics committees, and by allowing “opt-out” consent for many public health research projects. (shrink)

Since the last decades of the 20th century the meaning and content of knowledge has dramatically changed. This necessitates adopting a historical perspective in ap­proa­ching the questions of knowledge. But so far all the efforts of putting knowledge in a historical perspective since Hegel’s historization of Spirit either suffer from the limitations of the presupposition of the One or fail to ground the historicity of knowledge on the history of coming-to-be and passing-away. Moving from Heidegger’s ‘history of Being’ toward the (...) Aristotelian understanding of coming-to-be and passing away as a process of becoming has the potential to open up new avenues in approaching the historical question of knowledge as well as establishing its relation with the never com­plete ground of the entities as its historical a priori condition of possibility. (shrink)

Academic ethical values, having the well-deserved place by nursing and other scientific fields, and developing of the nursing science are proportionate to obeying the academic ethical values and internalizing those values. This study was carried out to determine the nurse academicians’ attitudes related to ethical values and related factors. The descriptive research was carried out between the dates of May and June 2017. The scope of the research consisted of nurse academicians working for two universities in Turkey and the sample (...) of the study consisted of 103 nurse academicians who had accepted to participate in the research. Data were collected by using “Descriptive Characteristics Information Form” and “Academic Ethics Values Scale”. Ethical considerations: Ethic approval from the institution, the Training and Research Hospital Noninvasive Clinical Studies Ethics Committee at the University of İzmir Katip Çelebi, and written approval from the owner of the scale were taken in order to carry out the study. The average age of the participants was 35.7 ± 9.6, 95% of them were female, and 51.5% of them were working as research assistants. The nurse academicians’ total item point average was 177,99 ± 11,01 and the attitudes of nurse academicians towards academic ethical values were positively. When the sub-dimension item point averages of the scale were examined, the lowest item point average was determined for the sub-dimension of “Scientific Research” as the highest item point average were being determined for the sub-dimension of “Teaching Process”. In this study that the participants’ attitudes towards academic ethical values were found meaningful at a high level, it was seen that academic assignment and age were important factors for the nurse academicians’ attitudes towards the colleagues and the teaching process. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

Following an introductory classification of prescriptive language that emphasizes the parallel between imperatives and moral language, this chapter distinguishes between the indicative and imperative moods of language. It then dismisses various attempts to account for imperatives, particularly their reduction to indicatives as well as expressivist theories like Ayer's and Stevenson's.

Through consideration of another practical case, this chapter opens the way to a generalization of the method of argument outlined previously. Multilateral cases raise the question of how the interests of all parties can be resolved into a determinate moral conclusion, which brings the discussion to a standpoint that has affinities with classical utilitarianism. Like the principle of universalizability, the form of the utilitarian principle espoused is purely logical. In both cases, the moral substance comes from fleshing out the parties’ (...) actual inclinations and interests. The chapter embarks on a short survey of the challenges faced by a utilitarian system of this kind, before considering the concept of happiness, act‐utilitarianism, and rule‐utilitarianism. (shrink)

Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? What can fiction tell us about the nature of truth and reality? In this excellent introduction to the problem of fictionalism R. M. Sainsbury covers the following key topics: what is fiction? realism about fictional objects, including the arguments that fictional objects are real but non-existent; real but non-factual; real but non-concrete the relationship between fictional characters and non-actual worlds fictional entities as abstract artefacts fiction and intentionality and the problem of irrealism (...) fictionalism about possible worlds moral fictionalism. R. M. Sainsbury makes extensive use of examples from fiction, such as Sherlock Holmes, Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary and examines the work of philosophers who have made significant contributions to the topic, including Meinong, David Lewis, and Bas Van Fraassen. Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms, making _Fiction and Fictionalism_ ideal for those coming to the issue for the first time. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

It is my intention in this paper to highlight the dangers which arise when people appeal to moral intuitions to settle questions in political, and in general in applied, philosophy. But first I want to ask why all or nearly all of us are in favour both of liberty and of equality – why all our intuitions are on their side. In the case of liberty it is easy to understand why. Although philosophers have held diverse theories about the concept (...) of liberty – theories which have been drawn together into two main groups in a famous lecture by Sir Isaiah Berlin – there cannot be much doubt that in the mind of the ordinary man to have liberty is to be under no constraint in doing what one wants to do. This, at any rate, is a main constituent of the concept of liberty as all of us understand it. Since, therefore, it seems self-evidently true that we want to be able to do what we want, we are bound to want liberty and, in general, to be in favour of it. We want it for ourselves; if we universalize our prescriptions, this constrains us to be in favour of it for others as well. That explains why, if any politician can claim that he is fighting for liberty, he is likely to win a large following. In the case of equality the matter is not so clear cut. (shrink)

Behavioral evidence for the COVIS dual‐process model of category learning has been widely reported in over a hundred publications (Ashby & Valentin, ). It is generally accepted that the validity of such evidence depends on the accurate identification of individual participants' categorization strategies, a task that usually falls to Decision Bound analysis (Maddox & Ashby, ). Here, we examine the accuracy of this analysis in a series of model‐recovery simulations. In Simulation 1, over a third of simulated participants using an (...) Explicit (conjunctive) strategy were misidentified as using a Procedural strategy. In Simulation 2, nearly all simulated participants using a Procedural strategy were misidentified as using an Explicit strategy. In Simulation 3, we re‐examined a recently reported COVIS‐supporting dissociation (Smith et al., ) and found that these misidentification errors permit an alternative, single‐process, explanation of the results. Implications for due process in the future evaluation of dual‐process theories, including recommendations for future practice, are discussed. (shrink)